

New Rules: Modern War and Military Professionalism

A. J. BACEVICH

"We had made up our minds to play whist, and when we sat down we found that the game was poker."¹

— J. F. C. Fuller

Once again, as in Fuller's day, these are disorienting times for soldiers. Recent events have torn history from its moorings, sweeping aside the constants that have defined our world since 1945. The usual hucksters grope about—to little avail thus far—to explain the implications of titanic changes now under way. Amidst the prognostications of self-anointed seers, Fuller's quaint metaphor provides as good an azimuth as any: the old rules no longer pertain; woe be to those who fail to take heed.

In truth, no one can foresee what new order will emerge once the flood-waters recede. Contemplating the result thus far, optimists proclaim it a triumph: the long, bloodless NATO campaign bids fair to culminate in a satisfactory resolution of the Cold War. Yet even if that expectation holds true, now is hardly the time for self-congratulation. A world in flux will not deal gently with those caught resting on their laurels.

Moreover, as they affect the Army, the blessings of success are proving to be mixed. Having prevailed, we now dismantle the instrument of victory. The prospect of drawing down to pre-Korean War levels—a prospect only momentarily forestalled by Iraqi aggression in the Gulf—does not show us at our most enlightened. Budget wars spur parochialism. Combined arms become competing arms. The instinct for self-preservation focuses institutional energies on a narrow range of bread-and-butter issues: justifying end strength, preserving division flags, and salvaging valued weapon programs.

In the long run, such efforts may well miss the point. However great our anguish about what the Army might *look like* during the decade now

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beginning, the larger question is what the Army might eventually *do*—where, in what fashion, and to what end will it bring force to bear in support of American interests? The Army's prospects for institutional health in the 1990s rest on our ability to provide in short order an answer to that question—an answer that satisfies ourselves but, no less important, one that compels popular and political support. Thus, even as it endures upheaval, the officer corps confronts the challenge of grappling with that most elusive and complex subject—the future.

A Dangerous Nostalgia

How should we begin? With a clear head and an open mind—no small requirement. For despite claims of pragmatism, military institutions display a pronounced weakness for woolly-headed sentimentality, especially on any subject relating to their own past. Thus, one precondition for useful thinking about the future is that we suppress our penchant for nostalgia. We must free ourselves from notions about warfare that however cherished no longer conform to objective reality. In this regard, the insights of Major General Franz Uhle-Wettler, an independent-minded German officer, ought to command our attention. Although written a decade ago, Uhle-Wettler's prescient critique of a nostalgic *Bundeswehr* remains fresh and timely. It also provides an example of the instructive, even idiosyncratic thinking to which any army in an era of rapid change should be responsive.

Uhle-Wettler chastised his fellow German officers for embracing a static and romanticized version of their past. Despite the fact that the terms of European war circa 1980 hardly resembled those that the *Wehrmacht* had faced decades before, Uhle-Wettler accused the *Bundeswehr* of languishing contentedly in the "shadow of Guderian," fancying itself heir to the old *panzer* traditions, assuming without reflection that Guderian's methods would apply directly to future wars.² Cataloging the ways in which any prospective European battlefield differed from the storied campaigns of World War II—the

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latter-day dependence on fragile, support-intensive technology, the huge cost and resultant scarcity of spares, the dearth of infantry, the spread of cities and forests uncongenial to armored formations—Uhle-Wettler noted with dismay that these factors had seemingly had no effect on how the *Bundeswehr* planned to fight. The German army's expectations of war had hardly changed since it had reached the outskirts of Moscow and fought its way back toward the suburbs of Berlin.

The theme underlying Uhle-Wettler's critique applies to the present-day American Army. Like so many of their fellow citizens, American officers profess an interest in history but actually prefer heritage—prettified versions of the past designed to make us feel good: events as interpreted by the brush of Don Stivers, whose sentimental depictions of the Old Army adorn so many soldiers' mantels. We are prisoners of our own romanticized history, captivated like our *Bundeswehr* comrades by the images of World War II.

If the *Bundeswehr* has lounged in the shadow of Guderian, we have for our part basked in the reflected glory of George S. Patton. The achievements of General Patton and his contemporaries as commanders of huge mechanized forces slashing their way to victory in continent-spanning campaigns have shaped our images of battle. Patton-esque triumphs provide the model for what we tend to think of as "real" war, in which the clash of materiel-rich opponents—presumably unfettered by complex political considerations—produces a decisive outcome. This model has achieved an exalted status akin to an article of faith, off-limits to skeptical reexamination.

Since 1950, the American Army has girded itself for such a conflict against the might of an aggressive Warsaw Pact. To say that recent world developments have rendered such an occurrence less likely as well as less fearsome is to put it mildly. Yet even as daily newspapers and the nightly news bombard us with breathless accounts of change, Patton retains his grip on the Army's collective psyche. The current boom in techno-military thrillers provides one indicator. The officer corps's appetite for such fiction—acclaimed as "realistic" and invested in some quarters with the capacity to teach "lessons" about combat—is astonishing. The staff duty officer whose desk drawer once hid a copy of *Playboy* now reads *Team Yankee* and feels virtuous at having done so. But what message is such fiction peddling? Simply this: that future war will be a reprise of World War II in the fancy dress of high technology. The officer corps is quick to embrace this reassurance that the way we have envisioned warfare need not change, that our soldierly aspirations and daydreams can remain intact.

This predisposition to see the future as a linear extension of the past finds its official counterpart in the efforts of the Army's doctrine developers. Their latest offering—known as Future AirLand Battle—begins with a "threat" that is yesterday's Soviets juiced up with ten years of technology but retaining

their old devotion to echeloned armies and fronts hell-bent on reaching the English Channel. Future AirLand Battle's postulated response updates existing doctrine with our own technological wonders—near-perfect intelligence and long-range precision weapons—to attrit the attacker with massive firepower and then to administer the coup de grace in the classic manner of mobile armored combat. Despite a gloss of new terms, it offers a vision of war with which Patton himself would have felt right at home.

The fact that the Soviets are rethinking their belief in early, unrelenting offensive operations receives scant consideration. The political (and moral) acceptability of such a weapons-intensive doctrine in the urban landscape of Western Europe—still the point of origin for scenario-writers—receives no mention. The suggestion that the American Army's focus just might be something other than high-intensity war against the Soviet Union is deflected with the specious assertion that Future AirLand Battle will apply universally, being as suited for anti-drug smuggling operations as for defending the Fulda Gap. Rather than a blueprint for adapting to a changing world, Future AirLand Battle testifies to our devotion to the status quo, our doggedness in clinging to the role we have insisted upon since Patton last led us to victory. Notwithstanding claims that it breaks new ground, Future AirLand Battle is a sterile manifestation of nostalgia—a self-indulgence that the Army today can ill afford.

Corrupted Professionalism

In truth, the roots of our attachment to a Pattonesque style of warfare go deeper than mere nostalgia. Historically, armies have devised operational styles—codified as doctrine—as much to protect self-defined institutional values as to advance the interests of the state they serve. In this regard, the very notion of “professionalism”—the attribute in which armies such as our own put so much stock—becomes a two-edged sword. On the one hand, professionalism implies competence and responsibility, with the latter requiring in the military’s case subordination to legitimate civilian authority. In return, society endows professionals with a virtual monopoly over their field of expertise and concedes to the profession broad autonomy. Society’s reliance on professionals to perform their critical role provides the source of prestige and prerogatives, underpinning professional self-esteem. Thus, members of any profession have powerful incentives to cherish and protect their “ownership” of the service that they provide to society as a whole.

In Western armies, the concept of professionalism incorporates the belief that the use of force to achieve political ends is exclusively the province of regular military establishments. Professional soldiers have a stake in preserving the tradition of war as a gladiatorial contest—a conflict between opposing regular forces, governed by rules and customs and directed by an officer elite.

They conjure up doctrine that assumes such a paradigm of war and that reinforces their monopoly. Thus, self-interest competes with—and may ultimately corrupt—their ability to view with detachment war and its political context.

In a highly original assessment of German military thought from 1914 to 1945, the historian Michael Geyer explores the consequences of allowing military self-interest to distort what he terms “the principled analysis of war.”³ Geyer’s subject is blitzkrieg, the most lavishly admired and probably the most imitated doctrinal concept of this century. According to Geyer, the stimulus behind the *Wehrmacht*’s development of the blitzkrieg during the interwar period went far beyond a perceived need to restore the battlefield mobility lost in the trenches of World War I. In the eyes of German officers, the real problem stemming from that conflict was that professionally designed and directed battle had failed to yield the expected decisive results in the late summer of 1914. Reacting to this failure, the adversaries had pursued policies of escalation that grotesquely increased the bloodletting yet only deepened the stalemate on the battlefield. The escalatory spiral culminated in a desperate attempt to stave off defeat by undermining the enemy’s popular will to resist, thereby rendering obsolete the expectation that the clash of armies would decide the outcome of war. In this sense, the Imperial German Army’s demise dates not from November 1918, but from 1916 when Field Marshal Erich von Falkenhayn unleashed his assault on Verdun. In terms of traditional military practice, Verdun was a “battle” devoid of objectives, conceived instead with the radical aim of employing mindless, unendurable slaughter to incite a popular revulsion against the war. Falkenhayn hoped to bludgeon the Allied peoples into demanding peace at any price.

Postwar German analysis exposed the full implications of such a strategy: The officer corps itself had “abandoned the concept of battle- and decision-oriented land warfare,” tacitly conceding its inability to deliver the one commodity that society demanded of its army—victory.⁴ Thus, the real task confronting German military reformers after 1918 was to salvage the *raison d’être* of their profession, devising techniques that would make swift, decisive victory once again a realistic possibility and thus making war once more the domain of military elites. To this end, comments Geyer, “The battle itself had to be rebuilt.”⁵

The *Wehrmacht*’s invincibility during the early stages of World War II seemed confirmation that German officers had succeeded in their task. Once again, battle produced victory—in Poland, Norway, France, Yugoslavia, and Greece. In Russia and North Africa too, for a tantalizing moment, German operational brilliance brought decision within reach. To the commanders who planned and directed them, these campaigns seemed to demonstrate that war in its traditional form had once again become a useful instrument and that their own status and prerogatives were thereby preserved.

*We must free ourselves from cherished notions
about warfare that no longer conform to reality.*

Geyer shows that this was an illusion. Despite the *Wehrmacht*'s string of early successes, the war culminated in disaster for Germany and its military. Dazzled by the achievements of Guderian, Rommel, and Manstein, most historians attribute Germany's defeat to the overwhelming weight of Allied forces, combined with Hitler's bungling intervention into matters that he should have left to his generals. Geyer refuses to let the *Wehrmacht* off the hook so easily. Instead, he argues that in their headlong rush to restore elite control of war, German military leaders abandoned any pretense of operational purposefulness. Seemingly "modern" in their outlook, their real goal had been profoundly reactionary. They sought to undo the effects of World War I, closing the Pandora's box of war between peoples and restoring "the era of institutionally contained warfare between armed forces." Intent upon a paradigm of warfare in which their own highly technical skills reigned supreme, when it came to strategy, German generals contented themselves with the facile assumption that "the mere accumulation of success" in the field would somehow eventually produce final victory.⁶ Thus, in pursuing its own institutional aims, the *Wehrmacht* succumbed to operational aimlessness. The Third Reich's centrifugal inclinations fed a continuous expansion of war aims, offering ample opportunity for dazzling tactical success that might earn for its architect a field marshal's baton. But ultimately such achievements contributed nothing except to the exhaustion and collapse of Germany. In the end, the generals themselves—at least the better ones—understood this, as exemplified by Erich von Manstein's bewildered admission that on the Eastern Front "no one was clear any longer . . . what higher purpose all these battles were supposed to serve."⁷

The German army's failure serves as a warning, one with particular relevance to times such as our own. The essence of that failure was hubris. Instead of adapting their army to the evolving character of warfare, German military leaders insisted that war conform to their own self-defined needs. Despite the German officer corps's much-touted genius, such an effort was doomed.

First principles do matter. Adherence to false principles destined the *Wehrmacht* to fail. For any army entering a new historical era, a commitment to principles derived from anything other than a detached, objective analysis of modern war—not war as we would *like* it to be—may likewise spell future defeat. Hence, the imperative at this moment in history is to challenge

orthodoxy, to question institutional biases, even to risk a lapse of internal consensus if required to develop a cogent vision of the tasks ahead.

Political Soldiers

Prior to undertaking such a critical self-examination, any army would do well to consider the counsel of a senior officer from a half-century ago: “He who follows a false tradition of the unpolitical soldier and restricts himself to his military craft neglects an essential part of his sworn duty as a soldier in a democracy.” Such a provocative invitation for military professionals to become politically engaged becomes altogether chilling when one learns the identity of the author: General Ludwig Beck.⁸ Germany’s last great Chief of the General Staff, the last to speak with any semblance of independent authority, Beck’s own professional conduct was sufficiently ambiguous to make him an unlikely source of wisdom. He toiled loyally and effectively to rebuild the German army during the very years when the Nazis were in fact snuffing out German democracy. Yet he alone among the first rank of military leaders later resigned in protest against the aggressive course upon which Hitler had embarked. And ultimately he sacrificed his life in an attempt to rid Germany of Hitler, an effort that combined clumsiness, high courage, and estimable patriotism, yet left its own discomfiting legacy. The conspiracy that Beck directed posed a question from which professional soldiers ever since have studiously averted their eyes: can circumstances exist that justify—even compel—direct military action against political authority or do the traditions of civilian control and an apolitical soldiery require obedience to the state regardless of how evil its leadership and how odious its policies?

The moral dilemma that embroiled Beck is precisely what qualifies him to speak to modern-day soldiers about the political dimension of their profession. Almost alone among senior German officers, Beck had come to see by the late 1930s that war was no longer (if it had ever been) a distinct phenomenon existing somehow apart from the rest of history. Rather, war was integral to history, affecting and affected by every other facet of human activity. Soldiers might pretend otherwise, might argue that military craft—*their* special competency, *their* preserve—decided the outcome of wars. But in Beck’s eyes, such thinking was parochial and obsolete.

For Beck, the essence of genuine professionalism was the recognition of war as a political act. Rather than treating Clausewitz’s axiom as a threadbare cliché, however, Beck would make it the starting point for all calculations about war—its aims, its risks, its conduct. History and Beck’s own experience had persuaded him that political, social, economic, and moral factors as much as events on the battlefield determined the outcome of war. For soldiers to argue that such considerations lay outside their proper sphere

of interest was absurd. To Beck, such claims amounted to an abdication of professional responsibility.

Thus, to serving officers today—absorbed in their pursuit of “technical and tactical competence”—Beck offers a caution and a challenge. He warns us that an officer corps that restricts itself to matters of craft may become morally indistinguishable from those *Wehrmacht* officers—honorable men by their own lights—who in doing their duty to the very end only propelled Germany that much further into the darkness. And he challenges us to embrace a mature vision of professionalism, one skeptical of faddish checklists of tenets, imperatives, or operating systems that promise shortcuts to professional mastery. Instead, he insists that soldiers—those in the field no less than those assigned to lofty staffs—appreciate the role of politics broadly defined in motivating, defining, and guiding any genuinely effective military policy.

Those who would protest the danger of soldiers becoming “involved” in politics miss the point. The exclusion of soldiers from politics does not guarantee peace. It only guarantees that those who command armies in wartime will be politically obtuse. This, in turn, increases the likelihood of irresponsibility in the conduct of war, leading, as Russell F. Weigley has observed, “to the emergence of war not as the servant but as the master of politics.”⁹ The military history of the 20th century is strewn with examples that support Weigley’s contention. Absent politically astute military leaders, this trend may prove irreversible.

Uncomfortable Wars

Does the need for a broader professionalism imply the prospect of wars that are entirely “new”? Not at all. Although the character of warfare is continuously evolving, that evolution is by no means random. Change in warfare adheres to a pattern, albeit one that is the product of many forces. Thus, the wars and skirmishes that will involve the United States for the foreseeable future are sure to reflect the salient characteristics of wars in the recent past. Although by no means hidden, those characteristics have elicited little interest on the part of an army absorbed in its preparations for “real” war, the World War III that has yet to occur. Thus a task of some urgency is for American soldiers to catch up on the insights and lessons derived from the last 40 years of conflict—lessons that various potential adversaries have already absorbed.

Of the lessons that demand attention, the foremost concerns the role of *the people* in warfare. However much soldiers may cling to old-fashioned notions of war as their special preserve, the truth is that the direct involvement of civilians—or, to use an anachronistic term, “the masses”—has become a hallmark of war in our time. They may be the medium within which conflict occurs; they may sustain the combatants or double as fighters themselves; or they may constitute a strategic objective whose support determines war’s

outcome—but almost without exception in modern wars, *the people* play an integral part. Events have indeed confirmed Falkenhayn's dimly perceived hypothesis—crudely and ineffectively exploited during World War I—that popular will forms the center of gravity of a nation's ability to wage war.

With this complicating presence of the civilian population in mind, General John R. Galvin has characterized ours as an age of “uncomfortable wars.” Nor does he intend the label to apply only to so-called “low intensity conflicts.” Rather, the Galvin hypothesis applies as much to the concerns of a SACEUR as it does to those of CINCSOUTH—perhaps even more so. “If war comes,” he writes, “we will continue to see involvement of the entire population,” pointedly emphasizing that “this will be true of all war, not simply of conflict at the lower end of the spectrum.”¹⁰

Does the Galvin hypothesis stand the test of recent history? A host of examples come to mind to illustrate popular involvement as the unifying theme in wars that are otherwise remarkably diverse: Vietnam, Afghanistan, El Salvador, Northern Ireland, Angola, Lebanon, and the Iran-Iraq War with its total mobilization of populations to fuel a conflagration that, like World War I, the professionals proved unable to win.

But what about the Arab-Israeli Wars and the Falklands? Characterized by the bold employment of large mechanized formations on remote, isolated battlefields, the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973 seemed to suggest that the tradition of gladiatorial combat remained alive and well, a message especially well-received in the US Army. Israeli victories did preserve the state of Israel from destruction. Yet if one aim of military strategy is security, those wars no more achieved their objective than did the massive German victories on the Eastern Front in 1941 and 1942. Instead, as Israel has poured ever more treasure into big-ticket weapon systems, its adversaries have turned to alternative people-based strategies against which fleets of tanks and fighter-bombers, no matter how skillfully employed, have little effect. And so the once-indomitable Israeli Defense Forces have found themselves bogged down first in Lebanon and more recently on the West Bank, engaged in “wars” far more complex, modern, and likely to recur in other parts of the world than the lightning campaigns for which the IDF first became famous.

As for the Falklands, that brief war may well be an exception—but one that serves only to prove the rule. From start to finish, the campaign was a throwback to an earlier era, a self-contained struggle ostensibly originating in that most ancient of disputes: rival claims to territory. Yet the economic and strategic insignificance of the Falklands suggests that in seizing the islands the Argentine junta had other aims in mind. Indeed, they did. A politically bankrupt regime mired in permanent crisis, the junta invaded the Falklands with the hope of distracting Argentines from the spectacle of their nation's internal decay. Gambling that the citizenry would embrace the euphoria of conquest as a

substitute for competent governance, Argentina's generals miscalculated by a wide margin. Caring little about the fate of the distant Malvinas, Argentines were content to leave the war to the warriors. Argentine ennui thus set the stage for British regulars to swat aside an opponent whose isolation on the Falklands stemmed as much from their countrymen's lassitude as from the blockade established by the Royal Navy and Air Force. The campaign for the Falklands may, indeed, show that war can occur in which the people are mere bystanders. But the war's outcome seems unlikely to inspire many to imitate the junta. Indeed, the unhappy fate of the generals suggests that to make war without the assurance of popular support is foolhardy in the extreme.

A New Synthesis

The armies of the West have arrived willy-nilly at the culminating point of a dialectical process whose origins coincide with the beginnings of modern history. The dialectic originated in 17th- and 18th-century Europe as an understanding between soldiers and statesmen over the proper conduct of warfare. That agreement had two key points. The first was that wars would be fought for limited aims with limited means, the goal being, according to General Sir John Hackett, "not a world title by a knockout" but rather "winning a modest purse on points."¹¹ The second part of the agreement was that responsibility for the direction of war belonged not to statesmen, scholars, clergymen, or aristocrats but to those who had embraced the military vocation. War was *soldiers' business*.

Not later than the time of Napoleon, that compact had begun to unravel. Spurred by technology and national enthusiasms, ends and means grew exponentially. It fell to the generation of World War II to abandon the agreement altogether. The actual conduct of that war—the vast pretensions of campaigns such as Operation Barbarossa, the terror bombing of European and Asian cities, the emergence of "unconditional surrender" as an acceptable war aim, and the American employment of atomic weapons—shattered the final restraints on war. Whatever vestige of warfare's classical theories survived Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the aftermath of World War II disposed of the ashes. The fever of Cold War legitimized the use of unlimited violence to achieve unlimited ends (the preservation of "our way of life"). The arcane hocus-pocus of deterrence theory justified the expansion of violence to the absolute maximum that technology could support. Although the product of civilian "defense intellectuals," too few professional soldiers questioned the concept of deterrence with its emphasis on violence without limit.

As the Soviet-American rivalry began to wane so did the support that such notions once enjoyed. With the postulated end of the Cold War, it has all but collapsed. Any Western army that fails to appreciate this—that persists in planning for apocalyptic war, for example, by retaining nuclear weapons as

integral to its warfighting doctrine—will forfeit its claim to popular and political support. An army deprived of such support can scarcely hope to serve a useful function.

Thus the Army's most daunting task becomes the completion of this dialectic, devising a new paradigm to supersede the concept of "total war" that has dominated our thinking since World War II. The rough outline of that paradigm is already visible: as a precondition of political and moral acceptability, armies will employ force only in discrete amounts and for specific, achievable purposes, with commanders held accountable for needless collateral damage; force will constitute only one venue among many that states will employ to achieve their aims, with military means integrated with and even subordinate to these other means—as has been the case throughout the recent Kuwait crisis; although senior military commanders should have a voice in this process of integration, the importance of these non-military instruments—diplomacy, information policies, economic leverage, and the imperatives of culture and morality—suggests that American soldiers will never again be permitted the latitude that Eisenhower enjoyed in World War II nor wield the authority that Marshall did as Army Chief of Staff. Yet these perceptions provide at best a bare glimpse of this new model of warfare. What remains is to spell out the model with all its implications and to undertake the difficult task of translating it into doctrine, organization, weapon systems, and training methodologies—a departure from recent practice no less dramatic than that entailed by the so-called Atomic Revolution.

Brodie vs. Bradley

Thus five challenges confront the Army as it enters a new era:

- To grasp the extent to which global developments have rendered obsolete many of our customary routines and assumptions;
- To be wary of our own selves—our penchant for nostalgia, our yearning to retain a distinct, elevated status in society—as obstacles to seeing war and its requirements objectively;
- To recognize that war long ago outgrew the boundaries of traditional military craft and to expand our conception of professionalism accordingly;
- To factor into any consideration of future wars the involvement of civilian populations—ours, the enemy's, and those of non-belligerents who nonetheless are more than mere observers—as central to the definition of war aims, strategy, and the methods that soldiers will employ in accomplishing their mission; and
- To postulate a new theory of warfare deriving not simply from the limits of technological possibility but from the political and moral dictates of our age—dictates that can redefine themselves with disconcerting suddenness.

Only by embracing these challenges can we hope to preserve that relevance to the national interest that must comprise the basis of any army's existence. The task is first and foremost one of intellect. And there lies the rub. Whether the officer corps can find within itself the intellectual muscle and creativity required remains very much in doubt.

American Army officers pride themselves on being doers rather than thinkers. Despite America's decades as a superpower, our ranks have yet to produce a theorist even remotely comparable to the Navy's Alfred Thayer Mahan. One is hard-pressed to think of any book by a senior American Army officer worth reading a second time. Not that we are inclined toward serious reading: given the choice, we much prefer Clancy or Coyle to Clausewitz or Sun Tzu.

Just as we get our fiction from pop militarists, so also have we come to rely on civilian defense intellectuals to guide our thinking about strategy and war. Since the 1950s at least, we have been *consumers* of ideas, conceding to others responsibility for *producing* them. When it came to spinning elegant theories that would make sense of warfare in the Atomic Age, Bernard Brodie outclassed Omar Bradley and RAND eclipsed the Army War College with ease. So the officer corps gave up, submitting, in Eliot Cohen's words, to "intellectual castration" at the hands of academics, whiz kids, and self-styled military reformers.¹²

At this time of epochal change, one yearns to believe that today's officer corps will reassert its authority on matters pertaining to war—a revival critical to the nation's well-being as well as to the Army's. Yet a wish alone offers poor basis for hope. After all, castration is irrevocable.

NOTES

1. J. F. C. Fuller, *The Army In My Time* (London: Rich & Cowan, 1935), p. 73.

2. Franz Uhle-Wettler, "Danger of Overreliance on Technology by the Armed Forces," (rpt.; Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1986), p. 41.

3. Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914-1945," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986), p. 546.

4. Ibid., pp. 535, 547.

5. Ibid., p. 537.

6. Ibid., pp. 547, 591.

7. Erich von Manstein, *Lost Victories* (rpt.; Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982), p. 202.

8. Quoted in Gordon Craig, *The Germans* (New York: Putnam, 1982), p. 249. For a recent profile of Beck, see Robert O'Neill, "Fritsch, Beck and the Fuehrer," in *Hitler's Generals*, ed. Correlli Barnett (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989), pp. 19-42.

9. Russell F. Weigley, "The Political and Strategic Dimensions of Military Effectiveness," in *Military Effectiveness, Volume III: The Second World War*, ed. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988), p. 341.

10. John R. Galvin, "Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm," *Parameters*, 16 (Winter 1986), 7.

11. General Sir John W. Hackett, *The Profession of Arms* (New York: Macmillan, 1983), p. 75.

12. Eliot A. Cohen, "Why We Should Stop Studying the Cuban Missile Crisis," *The National Interest*, No. 6 (Winter 1986), 10.